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United States Department of Labor
Employees’ Compensation Appeals Board
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__________________________________________
E.M., Appellant
and
DEPARTMENT OF
DEFENSE, DEFENSE FINANCING ACCOUNTING SERVICE, Columbus, OH, Employer
__________________________________________
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Docket No. 07-1074
Issued: March 21,
2008
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Appearances: Case
Submitted on the Record
Appellant, pro se
Office of Solicitor, for the Director
DECISION AND ORDER
Before:
DAVID S. GERSON,
Judge
COLLEEN DUFFY KIKO,
Judge
MICHAEL E. GROOM,
Alternate Judge
JURISDICTION
On March 6, 2006
appellant filed a timely appeal from an Office of Workers’ Compensation
Programs’ December 14, 2006 and February 28, 2007 nonmerit decisions
and September 15, 2006 merit decision. Under 20 C.F.R. §§ 501.2(c)
and 501.3, the Board has jurisdiction over the merits of this case.
ISSUES
The issues are: (1) whether
appellant met her burden of proof to establish that she sustained an emotional
condition in the performance of duty; and (2) whether
the Office properly refused to reopen appellant’s case for reconsideration of
her claim under 5 U.S.C. § 8128.
FACTUAL HISTORY
Appellant, a 53-year-old accountant, filed
a Form CA-2 claim for benefits based on a stress-related condition on
November 2, 2004. She indicated that she became depressed and
developed anxiety due to factors of her employment.
In a statement supporting her claim,
appellant alleged that inadequate training, job procedures and oral
communication by management over a period of months caused job stress, profound
depression and anxiety. In the middle of January 2004, she transferred
into the DECA-Europe Accounting Branch. This was a new division created to
perform accounting work transferred from Germany. Appellant was given an
opportunity to learn the accounting side of DFAS along with learning new
computer systems. She was seated in a four-person group of cubicles, by
herself, separated from the other accountants and financial specialists that
had transferred into the new division. Toward the end of January appellant
attended training on the Standard Financial System (STANFINS) computer system
that they would be using to input their work. The next week she received
training pertaining to the DECA area. Appellant asserted that the instructor
providing this training was unable to answer questions regarding why this
information was valid, since this course was directed to the OCONUS side of
accounting for interfund transactions and they would be working on the OCONUS
side of accounting for interfund transactions. She further asserted that the
instructor basically hurried through the remaining information provided in the
chapter covering interfund transactions.
In February 2004 when work began
transferring in for the DECA-Europe program, also known as OCONUS, two men from
Germany arrived to help with the transition to the new program and to provide
additional training. Appellant alleged that the two Germans did not provide
her with any individual training on the interfund transactions during the
duration of their visit, although these two men individually assisted other
employees who were being trained for the same tasks. She stated that the only
training she received occurred during two group meetings; one of these lasted about
30 minutes and concerned the OCONUS transactions along with other DFAS-Europe
payroll transactions, which were assigned to a coworker, and another which
lasted for approximately one hour.
Appellant alleged that in March 2004
Greg Swonger, her supervisor, the Chief of DECA, Europe Accounting Branch,
passed by her desk and, without even stopping, told her that she needed to get
the interfund transactions processed. She subsequently advised him that she
needed help; however, he told her he was in the middle of something or had to
attend a meeting and would get back to her. Appellant stated, however, that
when her supervisor was done with those assignments he began helping other
employees but did not get back to her. She stated that this scenario was repeated
several times, until he finally had a few minutes to spare and gave her a
demonstration of the new system. Appellant watched Mr. Swonger process an
interfund billing into the system; however, while he gave her screen prints of
his input he did not explain the process. The next day, realizing that he had
submitted incorrect input, Mr. Swonger checked the system. He cancelled
his initial input and reprocessed the transaction into the system with a
different interfund bill due to the error he had made. However, that
transaction also failed. Mr. Swonger did not explain this process to
appellant or why or how he determined that what he had originally processed the
day before was incorrect. The next day appellant checked the transaction, saw
it was processed but recognized that it contained an error code. She
researched the information from the report and from what she determined there
should have been nothing in the error code field. When appellant approached
Mr. Swonger with the report he told her not to worry about it but again he
did not explain what had happened. She stated that she was confused and
frustrated and returned to her desk to work on something else.
In April 2004 before inputting the interfund
transactions, appellant pulled and read all the reference material she could
find pertaining to the interfund process. She stated that she was unable to
find any desk procedures or any other reference material covering the OCONUS
side of interfund for guidance on processing the transactions into the STANFINS
system. Appellant then asked a coworker to help her. The coworker told her to
ask Mr. Swonger and another coworker for help. Since Mr. Swonger had
not helped appellant with her problem, she approached the other coworker, who
told her that she could not help her with the nonretail interfund transactions
since she had never done them before. Appellant again asked Mr. Swonger
for help, but the same scenario that had occurred during the previous month
happened again; Mr. Swonger had time to spend working with and answering
questions for others but never got back to appellant. Finally, with the end of
the month cutoff drawing near, she again approached him for help. Mr. Swonger
suggested that they go to see another coworker who had transferred in from the
German office, since she had worked on interfund transactions while working in Germany. This coworker explained how she inputted the transaction but stated that the
relevant codes had always been provided to her by someone else. Mr. Swonger
then told appellant to pull an old report of interfund transactions that had
been processed in the German office and use the appropriations they had used;
appellant then processed the information gathered from the old report. The
next day, the daily input report still showed error codes. Again appellant
approached Mr. Swonger and asked him why she was still getting error
codes. Again Mr. Swonger stated not to worry about the error codes. He
further stated that the STANFINS system was not designed to handle nonretail interfund
transactions. Appellant stated that she was beginning to feel stress and
anxiety every time she had to work the interfund transactions; she further
stated that her work problems were affecting her health by this time. She was a
diabetic and suspected that her blood sugar levels were elevated based on the
different body signs she was experiencing.
In May 2004 appellant spent several
hours searching for more information regarding the OCONUS system and re-reading
everything she found on interfund. Since no one else had been able to help
her, she decided to try something on her own. Appellant decided to use the
information from the old report, but use the fund code her coworker had told
her they had always used. According to the daily input report, some of the
transactions she processed were rejected and the one that had processed still
contained error codes. Appellant felt that nothing she did seemed to be
working right and her stress and anxiety persisted. She consulted a physician,
who confirmed her suspicions regarding elevated blood pressure and blood sugar
levels.
In June 2004 appellant decided she
would use the instructions from the course she had taken in January, even
though other students had questioned whether the procedures were correct. This
did not work either; she still was receiving error codes after inputting into
the system. Appellant’s stress and anxiety were increasing, and she was
beginning to experience difficulty sleeping at night.
In July 2004 appellant decided to
return to the methods by which Mr. Swonger had instructed her a few months
before, notwithstanding her doubts as to whether this method would work. She
stated that, while she was engaged in this procedure, a coworker walked up from
behind her and watched what she was doing. In the middle of processing one of
the transactions, this coworker spoke up and told appellant that her procedures
were incorrect and that she needed to delete all of the transactions she had
inputted into the system. She then walked away without explaining how to
correct her work. This made appellant even more confused because she believed
that this coworker’s advice contradicted what Mr. Swonger had told her
regarding these transactions. Soon after this Mr. Swonger approached
appellant and told her not to worry about processing the interfund transactions
that month because Karl, an employee from Germany, would be arriving in August
to “straighten out” these transactions. In addition, Karl would bring a report
that contained problems from previous interfund transactions that she had
processed. This resulted in more stress; appellant also began to experience
chest pains. She also was reporting for work in an exhausted state due to her
inability to sleep.
In August 2004 Karl arrived from Germany. He brought a report indicating that approximately one and a half pages of
transactions that had posted to the wrong ledger account and needed to be
backed out to the STANFINS system. With Karl’s help, appellant was able to
make reversals of these transactions in time to meet her end of the month
deadlines. She stated, however, that her stress and anxiety persisted because
she only had one month to get all the previously processed interfund
transactions corrected and reprocessed correctly prior to September 28,
2004, along with all of the other unfinished work on her desk.
In the middle of September 2004 DECA
headquarters called Mr. Swonger, stating that the APC code that they were
using was wrong and that none of the interfund transactions should be posted to
the APC code. Appellant stated that she had been told to use this APC code in
August, based on Karl telling them that all the interfund billings were for
surcharges. However, based on his telephone call with DECA headquarters,
Mr. Swonger was now contradicting Karl’s advice and advising his employees
that the interfund billings were not surcharges. Appellant stated that this
incident caused her stress level to soar to the extent that she was now having
anxiety chest pains all the time. She stated that she was so emotionally
stressed that she felt like her chest was going to explode. Appellant related
that she was now going to have to reverse all of the interfund transactions she
had processed in August and the beginning of September. DECA headquarters did
offer to provide the correct appropriation lines as she could send them a copy
of one of the interfund bills she received. She provided them with a copy of a
few of the billings. By this time, appellant related, every day she went to
work, till the end of September, she was completely stressed out, constantly
experiencing anxiety chest pains, and exhausted from a lack of sleep, and
feeling overwhelmed because she knew she needed to try to get as much done as
possible. She had to force herself to focus and comprehend what she was
working on. Appellant became so confused with so many transactions being
processed in and out of the system that she was having trouble figuring out
what still needed to be corrected. She stated that she became increasingly
anxious and stressed because she needed to close and reverse all of the
incorrect transactions back out of the system by the end of September. When
September 28, 2004, the last day, arrived, appellant processed everything
that she had researched that needed to be backed out of the system, along with
processing some of the interfund billings that DECA headquarters had provided
her. The next morning when she pulled the reports to check her work from the
previous day, she saw that the transactions she had processed using the
information the DECA headquarters had provided had been rejected. At that
point appellant was totally defeated, feeling that no one could provide her
with the correct information to do her job correctly. She felt completely
dysfunctional and could not even remember what she had tried to work on that
day or how she even got through the day.
On September 30, 2004 appellant felt
that she had to force herself to go to work. When she sat down at her desk,
before beginning work, she began crying uncontrollably, as she had reached the
point where she could no longer control her stress and anxiety; she felt that
she had to remove herself from the workplace. Appellant forced herself to go
to the division chief to tell her she needed to go home. She has not returned
to work since that day, as she believed herself no longer able to tolerate the
job-related stress.
In a statement dated November 9,
2004, Mr. Swonger rebutted appellant’s allegations. He stated:
“[Appellant]
joined our staff in January 2004 understanding this to be a new workload
for DFAS Columbus. The workload for DECA-Europe transferred to DFAS Columbus
beginning February 2004. The entire staff worked diligently to learn and
successfully accomplish this new workload. While the transition of a new
workload can be a stressful event, we do not concur with [appellant’s]
statements indicating her depression is a direct result of job stress and
inadequate support received by her employer. [Appellant] was provided with the
same amount and quality of support received by the entire transition team, as
outlined below. Additionally, we promote a team concept within the branch that
encourages open communication and dialogue to educate while resolving work-related
issues. As with any workload transfer, we experienced system problems and
confusing workload issues. The staff worked as a team to prioritize and
resolve these issues based on impact to the mission.
“Training: Prior
to the transition, [appellant] received official classroom training for STANFINS
Data Query, STANFINS nonretail accounting, and STANFINS DECA specific retail
accounting. This training is the same type of training used by the
organization from which the workload transferred. This training provided
[appellant] and the entire staff with the basic tools necessary to begin work
in DECA Accounting. All members of the staff were provided web sites, access
to the STANFINS user manual, flowcharts, and other various forms of
documentation to assist with researching DECA accounting issues. In addition,
[appellant] was provided the Standard Operating Procedures for resale
interfund, local purchase contracts, Vendor Credit Memorandums, and TBO
transactions. Also, she received the eportal location to obtain the CCAS
training manual, a hardcopy DLA customer service handbook, and the MILSBILLS
interfund regulation.
“In
February and August 2004, representatives from DFAS-Europe were onsite to
assist us. All employees were encouraged to ask for assistance specific to
their areas of responsibility. Since [appellant] did not communicate any
problems, her supervisor arranged a meeting in August to discuss the nonretail
interfund issues. After this meeting, [appellant] communicated to her supervisor
she felt more comfortable with the process.
“As
illustrated above, [appellant] was provided assistance in various aspects of
her job. Additionally, she was provided names of subject matter experts in
various areas within our organization.... In addition, the staff received
contacts at the DFAS-Europe storefront and at DECA-Europe. It seems, based on
[appellant’s] statement that she did not consider reference material, personal
contacts or contact with her supervisor to be adequate, however, the quality
was excellent. While her supervisor may have been busy with other issues when
[appellant] approached him, he did follow up when he had the time to devote his
attention to her questions.”
Mr. Swonger noted that the area in which
appellant was experiencing difficulties, nonretail interfund billings,
constituted only a small portion of her job duties. He listed a number of
other job duties appellant was charged with, including retail interfund bills,
retail unmatched disbursements on the accounts payable file, local purchase
control problem instruments, working in CCAS reports for two appropriations,
receiving transactions by others from the control section, issuing accordingly
and ensuring they are processed in a timely fashion, and processing corrections
initiated by the customer. Mr. Swonger indicated that appellant was very
successful in the majority of her other job duties, and received favorable
performance evaluations and awards as well as compliments from customers for
her responses to their issues.
He stated:
“[Appellant]
did not make us aware of her stress issue until September 30, 2004 when
she brought it to the attention of her Division Chief, Barbara Crawford.
During this discussion, [appellant] indicated that she has had a history of
depression for some time. She stated that she was struggling with her
depression currently due to certain situations in her life. [Appellant]
indicated her stress was exacerbated by her concerns over her job performance
and that her mother’s periodic health problems were also a major contributor to
her emotional state. At this time, [appellant] was reassured by Ms. Crawford
about her performance and approved for leave for the remainder of the week in
order to try to resolve her emotional issues.”
In regard to appellant’s assertion that
she was isolated from the other employees, Mr. Swonger stated that she
worked in the same area as her coworkers and her supervisor. When he received
notice of appellant’s claim that her depression was work related he offered her
a change of position, but she declined the offer. He enclosed copies of the
standard job descriptions for appellant’s position. Mr. Swonger indicated
that the employing establishment reviewed appellant’s time slips and determined
that her work comprised far less overtime and compensatory time than other
employees in the group. He stated that her time slips also indicated that she
worked a full day on only two of the months closing dates since January and
frequently used leave.
In a December 29, 2004 report,
Dr. Michael Chan, Board-certified in family practice, noted that appellant
had endured an emotionally abusive 30-year marriage. He related that appellant
had received nonspecific, inaccurate and sparse communication and direction
during her OCONUS training. Because of these factors, she was unable to
complete this segment of her work assignment. Dr. Chan advised that
appellant’s inability to complete this portion of her assignment and the
prolonged stress she endured in her office environment caused a relapse of
major depression, recurrent and severe. He stated:
“Prior to
this relapse, she had been stabilized on Effexor. This relapse manifested
itself in the following manner: poor concentration, erratic sleeping patterns,
high blood sugars [due to her diabetes], anxiety, depressive moods and chest
pains. In addition to the above symptoms, [appellant’s] relapse has put an
inordinate amount of strain on her current marriage. She believes that what
she wants and needs is ‘unimportant,’ therefore, she hesitates to communicate
fully with her husband and children. This causes misunderstandings in her
marriage.”
By decision dated February 4, 2005, the Office denied appellant’s claim
on the basis that she failed to establish any compensable factor of employment
and thus fact of injury was not established.
On March 2, 2005 appellant requested
an oral hearing, which was held on June 28, 2006.
In a report dated February 9, 2005,
Dr. Sarah Jonaus, Board-certified in internal medicine stated:
“[Appellant]
has been a patient of this clinic for many years. She was first diagnosed with
depression in 1994, and was stable until October 2004. At that time,
[appellant] had fairly acute and significant worsening of her anxiety and
depression. This was due to changes that occurred at work as well as social
stressors at home with her family. Unfortunately, at that time she was unable
to function well, and I did advise her to take some time off of work to
facilitate her recovery. Since that time, [appellant] has required multiple
changes in medication including increasing her dose of Effexor and use of
benzodiazepines including both Xanax and Ativan. She was evaluated at M[oun]t Carmel
East hospital for profound depression and has been treated in group therapy as
well as private therapy and evaluations by a psychiatrist. Because of her
profound depression, the patient was unable to work.
“In
addition to causing significant mental strain, [appellant’s] worsening
depression and anxiety also affected her diabetic control. During the time of
her increased anxiety and depression, [appellant’s] blood sugars were elevated
and much more difficult to control as was her blood pressure.”
Appellant submitted a statement describing
her previous mental health history, which was received by the Office on
March 24, 2005. She indicated that she was not diagnosed with
depression until her late twenties and was prescribed medication to help her
control the depression. At the age of 29, in 1980, appellant attempted suicide
by taking an overdose of anti-depressant medication. In 1994 she was
prescribed Prozac by a physician who was treating her for diabetes. Appellant
stated that through her treatment with Prozac and years of psychiatric
treatment she was able to terminate her 29-year marriage in 1998. She
continued to take Prozac until 2003, when she switched to Effexor at the behest
of Dr. Jonaus.
Appellant submitted a March 1, 2005
statement in which she challenged statements made by Mr. Swonger and
reiterated her previous allegations regarding her difficulties in the OCONUS
training program.
At the hearing, appellant reiterated her
allegations that she received inadequate training and inadequate procedures
when she assumed her duties with the nonretail interfund, OCONUS program. She
reviewed her history of psychiatric problems, indicating that she had
previously been on medication for depression and panic attacks, stemming from
her previous marriage, had attempted suicide in 1980 at the age of 29, and had
periodically missed days from work due to depression. Appellant stated that
she had been able to work until August 2004 when she began experiencing
panic attacks, chest pains, flare-up in her diabetes condition, and insomnia as
the end of the fiscal year approached and the pressure on her intensified. She
asserted that she constantly thought about her work ethic, even when she was at
home. Appellant testified that she feared that she was not serving her DFAS
customers in a competent manner or adhering to the employing establishment’s
accounting principles. She acknowledged that the employing establishment
offered her a transfer to another position; however, she stated that they did
not offer her this position until October 2004, after she had stopped
working due to her alleged emotional condition.
In a statement dated July 11, 2006,
Mr. Swonger disputed appellant’s testimony that the STANFINS system was
incapable of handling the nonretail interfund transactions and that appellant
did not receive adequate on-site training and support. He acknowledged that
there were some system problems and workload issues, as with any workload
transfer; however, he reiterated that he advised appellant that these errors
were not a problem. Mr. Swonger stated that he contacted personnel who
inputted nonretail interfund transactions at DFAS-Rome, obtained their advice
and inputted a sample transaction, which they reviewed to validate the
following day to see if it processed correctly. If they were not processed
correctly, they would reverse the erroneous transaction and try it again. Mr. Swonger
said that personnel arrived from Germany in August 2004 to help with the
transitional problems -- he noted that they also used the STANFINS system --
and reiterated that the majority of appellant’s workload was not related to
the nonretail interfund bills. He also reiterated that appellant’s lack of
ability to input these interfund bills was not held against her on her
appraisal.
In a July 11, 2006 statement, Ms.
Crawford, the former division Chief of DECA Accounting, stated that appellant
came into her office at the end of September and told her she was very stressed
and wanted to go home. Appellant indicated that she suffered from depression
and was having difficulty coping at work and was experiencing stress caused by
her mother’s health problems. Ms. Crawford stated that she was unaware of
appellant’s depression prior to that conversation. She advised that when
appellant returned to work she communicated more about her illness and they
rearranged her duties so that she no longer had to deal with nonretail
interfund transactions.
By decision dated September 15, 2006, an Office hearing representative
affirmed the February 4, 2005 Office decision.
By letter dated November 9, 2006, appellant
requested reconsideration.
By decision dated
December 14, 2006, the Office denied appellant’s application for review on
the grounds that it neither raised substantive legal questions nor included new
and relevant evidence sufficient to require the Office to review its prior
decision.
By letter dated January 24,
2007, appellant requested reconsideration.
Appellant submitted a
January 17, 2006 report from Janet Clark, Ph.D, in psychology, who noted
that appellant was involved in a dysfunctional marriage from 1969 to 2000 in
which she received minimal emotional support from her husband. This led to a
total loss of self-esteem, including a suicide attempt in 1980. Dr. Clark
related that appellant began to experience physical problems in 1992, which
were diagnosed as symptoms of diabetes in 1993. As noted earlier, appellant
was prescribed Prozac in 1994 and was diagnosed as having major depression in
1994. Dr. Clark further noted that appellant experienced increased stress
around September 2004, the point when her work-related problems
culminated, due to her mother’s deteriorating health.
Dr. Clark related that
appellant experienced irritability, sleeplessness, lack of contact with other
family members, low energy level, mood swings, crying spells and feelings of
hopelessness and helplessness. She diagnosed major depression, recurrent,
severe; panic disorder with agoraphobia, deferred, obsessive-compulsive
features. Dr. Clark noted that appellant returned to work in
January 2005, but attempted suicide in June 2005. She concluded:
“It is my opinion
that [appellant’s] disability is directly related to her employment as
accountant [with the employing establishment] as is typical of people who are
accountants, [appellant’s] personality characteristics include perfectionism,
devotion to work and productivity and overconscientiousness. When [appellant]
was unable to perform her job correctly, this placed a great deal of stress on
her. She attempted to solve the problem through a number of means, but she had
no experience and inadequate training in this specific area, so that she was
still unable to complete her job assignment with nonretail interfund
transactions. Over time, she felt more and more stressed, leading to her
emotional “breakdown” and her inability to function at work. Following return
to work, she remained stressed and soon relapsed, which led to an inability to
perform job duties and a suicide attempt.... There are major disruptions in
recreation and relationships as a function of her psychological difficulties
and self-esteem is low. She is unable to work.”
By decision dated
February 28, 2007, the Office denied appellant’s application for review on
the grounds that it neither raised substantive legal questions nor included new
and relevant evidence sufficient to require the Office to review its prior
decision.
LEGAL PRECEDENT
To establish that an emotional condition
was sustained in the performance of duty there must be factual evidence
identifying and corroborating employment factors or incidents alleged to have
caused or contributed to the condition, medical evidence establishing that the
employee has an emotional condition and rationalized medical opinion
establishing that compensable employment factors are causally related to the
claimed emotional condition.
There must be evidence that implicated acts of harassment or discrimination
did, in fact, occur supported by specific, substantive, reliable and probative
evidence.
The initial question is whether appellant
has established factors of employment that contributed to her alleged emotional
condition or disability. Where the disability results from an emotional
reaction to regular or specially assigned work duties or a requirement imposed
by the employment, the disability comes within the coverage of the Act.
On the other hand, disability is not covered where it results from an employee’s
fear of a reduction-in-force, frustration from not being permitted to work in a
particular environment or to hold a particular position, or to secure a
promotion. Disabling conditions resulting from an employee’s feeling of job
insecurity or the desire for a different job do not constitute a personal
injury sustained while in the performance of duty within the meaning of the
Act.
ANALYSIS
The Board finds that this case
is not in posture for decision.
Appellant alleged that she sustained
stress in the performance of her duties as an accountant pertaining to her
transition to the new OCONUS computer system, involving the inputting of nonretail
transactions, and her monthly and yearly quotas. The Board has held that
emotional reactions to situations in which an employee is trying to meet his or
her position requirements are compensable.
As appellant has related that her emotional condition was aggravated by the
requirements of her work as an accountant, she has established a compensable
factor of employment. Appellant’s supervisor, Mr. Swonger, acknowledged
that there were problems with the OCONUS system transition and that appellant
required assistance from him and from other employees on several occasions.
The reports from Drs. Jonaus and Chan indicated that appellant experienced
increasing anxiety, self-doubt, hopelessness and crying spells related to
stress at work since being transferred to a new position in January 2004.
These physicians noted that she felt overwhelmed, stressed and concerned about
her ailing mother, who had recently undergone open heart surgery. Dr. Jonaus
diagnosed depression and anxiety and released appellant from work. Dr. Chan
stated that appellant experienced poor concentration, erratic sleeping
patterns, high blood sugar level due to her diabetes, anxiety, depressive moods
and chest pains. He noted that she had endured an emotionally abusive 30-year
marriage and had developed a major depression condition, for which she had been
prescribed Effexor. Dr. Chan advised that appellant’s problems with
completing her assignments and the prolonged stress she endured in her office
environment caused a relapse of major depression, recurrent and severe.
The Board finds that appellant has
established a compensable factor of employment under Cutler. Appellant
therefore has established a prima facie claim for compensation. The
Board further finds that the reports from Drs. Jonaus and Chan are sufficient
to raise an inference of causal relationship between appellant’s emotional
condition and her accepted employment factor to require further development of
the medical evidence. The physicians attribute an aggravation of her
condition, in part, to the work requirements of her position. Furthermore,
appellant’s psychologist, Ms. Clark, opined that appellant’s difficulties in
performing her job duties regarding nonretail interfund transactions led to an
aggravation of her emotional condition. For this reason, the case will be
remanded to the Office for further development of the claim.
As to the other allegations raised, the
Board finds that appellant has submitted insufficient evidence to establish
compensable factors of employment. An employee’s emotional reaction to an
administrative or personnel matter is not covered under the Act, unless there
is evidence that the employing establishment acted unreasonably.
In the instant case, appellant has presented no evidence that the employing
establishment acted unreasonably or committed error with regard to the
incidents of alleged unreasonable actions involving administrative or personnel
matters on the part of the employing establishment. The Board has held that an
employee’s dissatisfaction with perceived poor management constitutes
frustration from not being permitted to work in a particular environment or to
hold a particular position and is not compensable under the Act.
Appellant has not submitted sufficient evidence to support her allegations that
the employing establishment ignored her requests for assistance, gave her
incorrect and contradictory instructions, imposed an unusually heavy workload
and issued unreasonable deadlines. She asserted that she received insufficient
training and guidance from management in transitioning to the OCONUS system and
inadequate responses to her requests for assistance. However, these complaints
were rebutted by the statements from Mr. Swonger, who indicated that
appellant underwent the same training procedures as other employees in her
group and had access to the same training resources and means of assistance.
The memoranda and letters from Mr. Swonger and other management personnel
indicated that appellant, along with other employees, experienced difficulties
in working out the inevitable glitches entailed by transitioning to a new
system, but that the majority of its employees eventually adjusted and adapted
to the new procedures. The employing establishment demonstrated that it made
efforts to assist appellant with her transition and that she was given
sufficient time to complete her work assignments. Mr. Swonger and
Ms. Crawford also indicated that appellant was assisted by other employees
who were knowledgeable in the OCONUS program. While Mr. Swonger
acknowledged that he had been busy during one or two of the times when
appellant approached him for assistance, he asserted that he endeavored to get
back to appellant and address whatever concerns she may have had. In addition,
while appellant asserted that she felt extreme pressure due to the errors she
encountered while attempting to use the new system, her persistent inability to
successfully input nonretail, interfund transactions, and the pressure to meet
quotas and deadlines, the record indicates that the employing establishment
sought to reassure appellant that it had anticipated errors and problems with
the transition. Mr. Swonger produced evidence that management was
understanding and supportive of appellant and had tried to assuage her concerns
over the errors and difficulties in adjusting to the new system. He also
demonstrated that he had attempted to tailor appellant’s work requirements and
standards to whatever difficulties she was experiencing. Ms. Swonger also
stated that management had repeatedly indicated to appellant both verbally and
in writing that it wanted to work with her in addressing performance issues. Appellant
also has not established that she was subjected to unreasonable demands in
setting performance guidelines for her. Thus, these actions on the part of
management did not constitute a factor of employment.
Regarding appellant’s allegation that she
developed stress due to the uncertainty of her job duties and her insecurity
about maintaining her position, the Board has previously held that a claimant’s
job insecurity is not a compensable factor of employment under the Act.
Finally, in regard to appellant’s assertion that she was isolated from the
other employees at the worksite, the employing establishment indicated that she
worked in the same area with her coworkers and her supervisor.
Accordingly, appellant has presented no
evidence that the employing establishment acted unreasonably or committed error
with regard to these incidents of administrative managerial functions. A
reaction to such factors did not constitute an injury arising within the
performance of duty; such personnel matters were not compensable factors of
employment in the absence of agency error or abuse.
On remand, the Office should
prepare a statement of accepted facts and further develop the medical evidence
as appropriate. After such development as deemed necessary, the Office shall
issue a de novo decision.
CONCLUSION
The Board finds that the case is not in
posture for decision.
ORDER
IT
IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT the September 15, 2006 decision of the Office
of Workers’ Compensation Programs is affirmed in part, and set aside and
remanded in part, for further action in conformance with this decision.
Issued: March 21, 2008
Washington, DC
David S.
Gerson, Judge
Employees’
Compensation Appeals Board
Colleen
Duffy Kiko, Judge
Employees’
Compensation Appeals Board
Michael E.
Groom, Alternate Judge
Employees’
Compensation Appeals Board